This article explores the effect of European Union (EU)'s food safety regulations on the trade of baby food products. A large number of medical studies have shown that pesticides and contaminants contribute to various health problems including cancer, lung disease or reproductive, endocrinal and immune system disorders. They also agree that children are more vulnerable to the dangers of pesticides and contaminants because as soon as they start eating solid foods, they eat a limited number of food items most of which are fruits and vegetables. In order to protect the health of the most vulnerable part of the population, the EU's regulations establish that no more than 0.01 mg/kg of any single pesticide residue is permitted in baby food products. In this respect, the EU differs from most of its trading partners, the majority of which do not differentiate food safety regulations according to the consumer population age. The purposes of this paper is to compare the EU regulations on Maximum Residual Level of pesticides to those of its major trading partners through a severity index and quantify the impact of the specific European regulations on the trade of baby food products. Results show that the specific EU regulations may be considered as a tool protecting vulnerable population.
1-Introduction
Food safety and food quality are the two sides of the same coin. Food safety is a fundamental requirement of food quality and this is particularly true when children are involved. A large number of medical studies have shown that pesticides and contaminants contribute to various health problems including cancer, lung diseases or reproductive, endocrinal and immune system disorders. They also agree that children are more vulnerable to the dangers of pesticides and contaminants because as soon as they start eating solid, they eat a limited number of food items among which fruits and vegetables take an important part. This increases children's exposure to substances they are less capable of metabolizing than adults (Mühlendahl et al. 1996; Koletzko et al. 1999 ).
In order to protect children from deleterious substance intake, the EU has erected very severe rules concerning baby and infant processed food. Since 2006, MRL of pesticides in baby and infant food in the EU are covered by Directive 2006/125/EC on processed cereal-based foods and baby foods for infant and young children (European Commission, 2006a) and Regulation EC 1881/2006 setting maximum levels for certain contaminants in foodstuffs (European Commission, 2006b ). This legislation rules out processed cereal-based foods and baby foods that contain residues of individual pesticides at levels exceeding 0.01 mg/kg. Non-European trade partners may raise concerns about the obstacles to trade this Directive can create. "On one side, regulations are often necessary to alleviate market failures, but on the other side, domestic regulations may be imposed simply to impede imports of foreign competitors " (Disdier and Marette 2010, p. 713) .
In this paper we take advantage of a recent part of trade literature which aims to develop indicators which aggregate over food safety regulations and standards (Achterbosch et al., 2009; Rau et al., 2010; Drogué and DeMaria, 2012; Winchester et al., 2012; Li and Beghin, 2012; Vigani et al., 2012) . These indices allow capturing asymmetries or dissimilarities between importing and exporting countries' safety regulations and are further used in econometric analysis. Our paper reinforces this literature as it is to our knowledge, the only paper to apply this methodology to agro-food processed products. In their 2009 working paper Achterbosch et al. develop a heterogeneity index to compare sanitary regulations and apply it to the Chilean fruits exports. Rau et al. (2010) build a similar heterogeneity index and apply it at various agricultural products among which the only processed product is cheese. But cheese does not encompass the same kind of issues as baby food because it can easily be reduced to milk its almost only component. Drogué and DeMaria (2012) proposed another measure they call regulatory distance which is the Pearson distance between MRL of pesticides in apples and pears. Winchester et al. (2012) , introduce the heterogeneity index developed by Rau et al. (2010) and introduce it in a gravity equation assessing trade impacts of dissimilarity in regulations between 10 regions and 8 product groups (beef, pig meat, cheese, barley, maize, rape and some fruits and vegetables). Vigani et al. (2012) study the trade impacts of Genetically Modified Organisms and finally Li and Beghin (2012) build an original aggregation index of non-tariff measure and apply it to an impressive list of 340 raw products.
The other originality of this article is that it is the only one to deal with baby food international trade while this market has experienced noticeable annual growth in the recent years. In certain regions of the world (Brazil, Russia, China and Argentina) this growth can reach more than 10% (Agriculture and AgriFood Canada, 2011) . Most papers dealing with baby foods apply on consumer preferences (Maguire et al., 2006; Peterson and Li, 2011) .
The article is structured as follows. After introducing the EU specific regulation on baby and infant food in Section 2, we propose the specification of the gravity equation and an index used in order to estimate the degree of severity imposed by the EU on contaminants in food for children under the age of three (Section 3). Then we introduce the estimation techniques (Section 4). The data are described in Section 5. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 concludes.
2-Background information
Physicians have alerted policy makers on the health problems posed by pesticide exposure through food intake from the sixties. (WHO, 1987) .
However this concern has only recently been taken into account. Until 1999 there was no unified European policy regulating pesticide residues in baby food. MRL of pesticides were set at national levels. Few countries had specific rules on food intended for infants (children under the age of 12 months) and toddlers (between one and three). Mühlendahl et al. (1996) report that in Europe, only France, Switzerland, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg have specifically ruled lower limits.
At the European level food for babies or toddlers was regulated by Directive 91/321/EEC concerning infant formulae and follow-on formulae (European Commission, 1991) and Directive 96/5/EC on cereal-based foods and baby foods for infants and toddlers (European Commission, 1996) , establishing in their article 6 that such products "shall not contain any substance in such quantity as to endanger the health of infants and young children. Where necessary, the maximum levels of any such substance shall be stipulated at a later date". The legislation was rather ambiguous and not compulsory to set specific limits. However, in 1993 attention was drawn to the question of pesticide residues in baby food because "excessive lindane concentrations (0.04 ppm) were found in imported vegetables from Spain prepared as baby food". The manufacturer whose product was withdrawn from the market complained to the EC "with the aim of getting the §14 of the German Dietetic Directive -setting the limit at 0.01ppm -revoked on the ground that it constituted an illegal barrier to trade" (Mühlendahl et al., 1996) . Thus, the EU commissioned a scientific report on pesticide residue and baby food. On 23 September 1994 the Scientific Committee for Food concluded that "it had no reason to believe that a content of 0.04 mg of lindane per kg of baby food would cause reason for concern" (European Commission, 1994). But three years later the same committee "concluded that if the maximum residue limit were to be set at 0.01 mg/kg in foods intended for infants and young children, there is a possibility that an infant could exceed the Acceptable Daily Intake (ADI) for pesticides having an ADI at 0.0005 mg/kg b.w. (per kilo of body weight) or lower." (European Commission, 1999a) .
In 1996 the EC has set a specific directive (Directive 96/5/EC) on processed cereal-based foods and baby foods for infants and young children (European Commission, 1996) stipulating in its Article 6 that: "Processed cereal-based foods and baby foods shall not contain any substance in such quantity as to endanger the health of infants and young children. Necessary maximum levels shall be established without delay." The directive of 1996 was amended a first time in 1998 with no impact on pesticides limits. In 1999 it was amended again by Commission Directive 1999/39/EC of 6 May 1999 replacing the former Article 6 adding that "processed cereal-based foods and baby foods shall not contain residues of individual pesticides at levels exceeding 0.01 mg/kg, except for those substances for which specific levels have been set in Annex VII, in which case these specific levels shall apply" (European Commission, 1999b) . However, the prohibition of trade in products not complying with this Directive was delayed until the 1 July 2002. No other country specifically regulate foodstuff for children. Some countries such as the USA or Canada consider sensitive subpopulations as children in their risk assessment process rather than setting specific MRL for them. The USA incorporated into the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 many recommendations issued in the National Research Council 1993 publication "Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children". This leads for instance to ban the use of organophosphate pesticide from "kid food" like apples (US EPA, 2010) .
In order to protect the health of the most vulnerable part of its population, the EU's regulation establishes that no more than 0.01 mg/kg of any single pesticide residue is permitted in baby food products. This creates a difference in regulations between the EU and most of its trading partners, the majority of which do not differentiate food safety regulations according to the consumer population age. Thus the specific European policy, albeit consumer-driven, may be seen as a form of protection constraining other countries to export primary product rather than processed products to the European markets. This issue is particularly acute as the emerging market of baby food has increased by 30% in the EU these recent years according to UN COMTRADE data.
In order to quantify the impact of the specific European regulation concerning MRL of pesticides on trade of baby food products, firstly, we compare the EU regulation to the regulations of its major trading partners by developing an indicator based on the methodology described in Li and Beghin (2012) . This index is hereafter called "severity index" as it indicates if the EU regulation on MRL of pesticides in infant and baby foods is more or less stringent compared to the one of its major trade partners. Secondly we introduce this indicator as an exogeneous variable in a gravity equation. Our objective is to assess the trade implications of the regulatory standard levels in the baby food sector.
3-Gravity model specification and severity indicator
Gravity modeling is now a widespread tool in trade research. It allows taking into account a wide range of trade issues from which those concerning food safety regulations constitute the core of a growing literature (DeMaria et al., 2011) .
The standard gravity equation can be written as follows:
Where are the imports of country i from exporter j at time t of product k. As suggested by De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011) this term is in nominal values. and are respectively the Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in current US dollars of the importing and exporting countries at time t. InfantPop it and InfantPop jt are the infant population of importing and exporting countries respectively, they are used as proxies of consumption. reflects the impact of transport costs, proxied by the distance between countries. , is the EU applied advalorem tariff.
is our key variable. As previously said it is based on the one proposed by Li and Beghin (2012) . It is a protectionism index and it also allows aggregation over a multitude of substances. But for our specific issue this indicator must be adapted. Indeed, in their paper Li and Beghin consider the MRL as being protectionist if their values exceed those set by the Codex.
Conversely we consider the European legislation as protectionist if the values of the MRL set by the EU are lower than the corresponding MRL of its trading partners. We are interested in the EU exclusively as an importer. Adapting the methodology of Li and Beghin (2012) , leads to compute their index of severity as follows:
Where is the MRL set in the EU for pesticide p and product k; stands for the MRL of exporting countries for pesticide p and product k; in order to normalize our index and avoid division by zero is the greatest MRL found in all regulations for products k and substance p, N is the total number of substances and it is equal to 894. We are interested in assessing the effects of the EU discipline over time. But we do not have data on the evolution of the regulation of MRL of pesticides before 2008. As we know the implementation year of the EU Directive, we estimate equation 1 using the Least Square Dummy Variables technique (LSDV) 2 adding a dummy called eureg2002 which catch up the effect of the EU 1 Fixed effects provide a solution to unobserved heterogeneity and account for multilateral resistance terms and provide more consistent specification (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006 
4-Estimation procedures
The simplest way to estimate Equation (1) is using ordinary least squares (OLS). But in this case, a first problem arises because too many zeros are present in the dataset. This is often the case when very disaggregated data are used. Excluding zero observations creates a selection bias and adding a small constant to trade flows introduces a measurement error. This matter has already been discussed extensively and several alternative approaches as Pseudo Poisson Maximum
Likelihood method (PPML), Two-Step Models (Helpman et al., 2008; Martin and Pham, 2008) and Zero-Inflation Models (ZIM) (Burger et al., 2009) have been proposed to handle zero trade.
As showed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) If the trade flow variable is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, then a likelihood function can be derived which first and second order moment conditions can be solved to obtain the vector of coefficients (Gourieroux et al., 1984) .
Our specification can be written as follows:
3 For relatively short time periods we can use non time varying exporter and importer fixed effects.
where is the matrix including all explanatory variables. The consistence of the PPML estimator is ensured assuming that the conditional mean is equal the conditional variance ( | ) ( ). Countries time invariant specific fixed effects are included to capture unobserved country heterogeneity such as multilateral resistance term (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003) .
Our dependent variable has a mixed distribution characterized both by the long right-tail and a mass of zeroes. As specified by Chaney (2008) or Helpman et al. (2008) , zeros may reflect the existence of fixed costs or entry cost impeding countries to sell their products in the destination's markets. As a further check we also use the Heckman Two-Step procedure (Heckman, 1979) , which corrects the possible biases and allows us to investigate the effects of the variables on both the probability of trade (extensive margin) and the volume of trade (intensive margins). The full marginal effect of this variable is the sum of the extensive and intensive margins. The procedure includes two equations: a selection equation incorporating a binary decision variable "whether to trade or not" and an outcome equation determining the intensity of trade.
The selection equation is given by:
Where is a latent variable, is a vector of explanatory variables influencing and is the error term. is not observed but we observe whether countries trade or not, therefore:
{
The outcome equation determines the value of trade:
is a vector of independent variables determining the natural logarithm of , it is observed if d = 1; the error terms and are independently across observations and jointly normally distributed with covariance
. The variance of u is normalized to 1 because only d is observed; not . The expected value of is conditional expectation of conditionated on it being observed ( :
Where is the Inverse Mill Ratio (Greene, 2008) .
For robust identification, Helpman et al. (2008) suggest that both the selection and outcome equations include the same independent variables except one, that is, a variable influencing the fixed costs and not the costs of trade, of EU and trading partners. In our case the selection equation, includes also the severity measure. Its exclusion from the outcome equation provides the exclusion restriction. Our empirical versions are:
The equation 10 includes the inverse mill ratio ( ; all variables are listed in table 2 in appendix. The equations can be estimated simultaneously, through the maximum likelihood method, or successively (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009 ). For robustness we use both procedures, in the latter the selection equation is estimated by a probit, we use the standard OLS to estimate the outcome equation.
5-Data
The baby food sector is very competitive and dominated by multinationals among which the ing" substance may be either unregulated (when the country considers it innocuous), or regulated by default (a default limit applies) or it may just be "missing" for various reasons (such as a problem in data collection). To tackle this issue Li and Beghin (2012) use a list of substances common for all countries, the one drawn up by the Codex Alimentarius, hereafter Codex. We think that using this list produces a loss of information because the Codex does not regulate many substances (127 overall). We decide to work on the longest list of pesticides. To deal with missing substances we follow Drogué and DeMaria (2012): (i) when the country has information on the default value, we replace the missing value by the default value (see table 1 in Appendix);
(ii) if the pesticide is not regulated and information on default limit is missing we replace the missing value with the maximum value found in the data.
Another aggregation issue arises because MRL of pesticide are generally defined for raw products and very seldom for processed ones. In the trade nomenclature of the European Union baby food products are defined at the NC8-digit level by 6 codes: 16021000 homogenized preparation of meat; 20051000 homogenized vegetables; 20071010 and 20071099 homogenized preparation of fruits; 21041000 soups and broth preparations; 21042000 homogenized composite food preparations. We must find out how to associate the pesticide MRL to these six NC8 commodities. As we are interested in baby food, we focus on foodstuffs which make up baby and infant 'ready-toeat' meals. We select them based on the various recipes proposed by the two leading French companies Blédina and Nestlé. This selection makes us consider 26 raw products allocated among 4 class of which 6 fruits (apples, apricots, bananas, orange, peaches and pears); 11 vegetables (eggplants, green beans, carrots, leek, peas, pepper bell, potatoes, spinach, squash, tomatoes, zucchini); 5 cereals (barley, corn, oats, rice, wheat) and 4 meats (bovine, hog, poultry and turkey). We compute for each country pair (EU versus its main importers) and substance, the severity index for these 26 products. We then derive the severity index by class considering the minimum index value by substances within a class. Finally we associate the class and NC8
commodities by their main common ingredients: meats for NC8 (16021000), vegetables for NC8 (20051001), fruits for NC8 (20071010), for NC8 (21041000) which is a composite of cereals and vegetables or cereals and fruits or meat and vegetables or meat, vegetables and cereals we take for each substance the minimum value over the 4 class. Table 1 shows the values of the severity index by NC8 commodities and countries. They range between 0 and 1.26. A value equal to 0 means that the EU regulation is equally or less stringent than the exporter's regulation; conversely a high value implies that the EU applies a stricter regulation. Our intuition is that a higher index value should reduce trade and vice-versa. South Africa, Norway and Switzerland report an index value of the index equal to zero because they apply the same regulation as the EU. Argentina, Australia, China, Korea, Mexico, Russia and USA report a value of severity close to 0, which means that in general their regulations are very close to that of the EU, this is due to the fact that these countries apply zero tolerance provisions or a very low maximum level for those substances. On the contrary Brazil, Chile, India, Japan and Philippines display larger values between 0.77 and 1.26. The matching of our different sources leads to an original database that associates trade, MRL and country level variables at product line. We consider only countries for which the information on MRL is available. We exclude from our original sample influential outliers, i.e. observations with too high values of trade.
Finally we get a database including only 20 EU's members' states as importing countries and 37 exporting countries 5 , over the period 1998-2010 and sub-period 2008-2010. We take intra-EU trade into account. The descriptive statistics of our variables of interest are displayed in Table 6 .
The Table 7 reports the simple correlations among the variables used in the empirical model. As expected, trade is positively correlated with GDP, female employment rate, fertility rate, common border and common language while trade and tariff, distance and NTM are negatively correlated. Finally, the positive correlation between tariff and severity measures suggests complementarity between these protectionist variables.
6-Estimation results
The empirical analysis includes six processed product lines and four estimation techniques. Results are displayed in Table 3 , 4a, 4b and 5 in appendix.
In Table 3 Table 3 Column 2 shows that the standard gravity variables have the expected signs. The GDP are positive and statistically significant (0.46 for importers and 0.38 for exporters), distance and tariff variables display negative and significant coefficients (-0.60 and -0.53 respectively), common language and common border have the expected positive signs (0.51 and 0.63 respectively).
We also control for the infant population of the importing and exporting countries. The first term is negative and statistically significant (-0.0001) but very close to zero, on the contrary the second one is positive but not statistically significant 6 . The eureg2002 term which captures the entry in force of the EU regulation on MRL of pesticides in baby food reports a negative but low coefficient (-0.28). We also control for the enlargement of the EU but this term does not seem to have any impact on trade.
Turning to LSDV estimation, we find positive and statistically significant coefficient of importers GDP (1.27) while non-significant coefficient of exporters GDP. Distance, common Border test (Ramsey, 1969) to detect whether the equation is correctly specified and the significance of the test suggests that the model is well specified (0.64).
Then, in order to verify the effects of the EU regulation by exporters, we run the gravity equation
considering an interaction term between the severity index and the exporters fixed effects:
The effect of the severity index on a specific exporting country is given
This analysis provides evidence on positive and statistically significant effects of the European "severity" for Chile (4.03), New Zealand (9.08) and the Russian Federation (2.16), and negative and statistically significant effects for Japan (-7.24) , the remaining coefficients being nonsignificant. Positive results for Chile, New Zealand and Russia are rather surprising as they mean that the decrease of the regulatory distance between the EU and these partners would decrease trade. One possible hypothesis is that the EU regulation act as a guarantee of food safety for consumers. As baby food is a sensitive good, if the EU would increase its MRL to move closer to its partners' limits, it would have a disastrous impact on consumption and thus on imports.
To conduct a deeper analysis in our understanding of the link between safety regulation and trade, we analyze the influence of the severity measure on the probability of trade. Indeed our two precedent results may appear as contradictory as the results of the LSDV show positive results of the European regulation and those of the PPML negative ones. Using the Heckman two steps procedure we study in which way the severity measure may influence the probability of export to the EU market. Results are reported in Table 5 . The Heckman selection equation displays an unexpected positive but close to zero impact of distance (0.16) and negative and significant impact (-0.23 and -0.66) of tariff and severity. This could be explained by the fact that the baby food market is dominated by few multinational firms, with a highly outsourced production.
For this specific high value added market, what matter most are the safety and quality levels rather than the distance or the country's ability to be in a given geographical area. Thus physical distance does not have a big influence on the probability of having positive trade flows. Tariff displays a lower coefficient -0.23 than severity. This result confirms our intuition that a more severe rule on MRL increases the difficulty to export to the EU market because of additional costs to comply with the EU regulation. Here the specific EU's regulation on baby food acts as a fixed entry cost. This result is similar to Jayasinghe et al. (2010) which find that sanitary and phytosanitary measures have a negative and significant impact on the probability of trade.
To complement our result, we have re-estimated the gravity model including the severity index in the outcome equation. In this second estimation, results 7 are still the same and the coefficient of the measure of severity is not significant. The estimated selection coefficient ( ̂) is statistically significant (0.82), confirming that the absence of control for zero flows generates biased results.
The estimates of the outcome equation show that the GDP, consumption and past colonial relationships have no impact on the level of trade, distance displays the correct sign (-1.06) while tariff would impact trade positively (0.36). These results confirm the previous one. These results provide evidence that at aggregated level, the EU requirement may constitute a barrier to entry in its own market but once overcome can help to foster trade.
Even in this case, the Ramsey specification test (Ramsey, 1969 ) is used to detect whether the outcome equation is correctly specified. The significance of the test suggests that misspecification exist (0.001). Given the result of the Reset test for the Heckman procedure, we need to have a proof on the direction of the sign found in the selection equation, thus we re-estimate the gravity equation using ZIM. The ZIM's results confirm the direction of the sign found in the Heckman procedure. The severity measure has a negative impact on the probability of trade but no impact on the level of trade. Complying with the European requisite is an obligation, and may constitute a barrier to market entry but does not affect the amount of trade. These results are not reported, but available upon request.
As for the robustness check of our results, we have estimated different specifications of the gravity model and each specification confirms our results. We have also checked for European trade preferences granted under the EU Generalized System of Preferences including in the gravity equation a dummy variable accounting them for 8 . Results are not reported but are available upon request. The GSP dummy variable exhibits a positive but not significant coefficient and the severity measure is still negative. As a further robustness check, we have run the gravity equation considering the EU members at the aggregate level. In this case, the one and only variable influencing trade across countries is the severity measure.
In addition, we have also considered two analyses based on a longer period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) . First, we have considered an interaction term between the EU regulation dummy variable and the severity measure. This term has a negative and a significant influence on trade. Then, we have performed another estimation introducing the severity measure in the specification as an exogenous variable from 2002 to 2010 and results are still confirmed. Results are not reported but are available upon request.
As a final robustness check, we have re-estimated the gravity equation using the Generalized Negative Binomial Regression Model (GNBRM) and the Hurdle Double Models and results are quite similar to the PPPML and the Heckman procedure.
7-Discussion and conclusion
The medical literature agrees on the fact that pesticides and contaminants contribute to numerous health problems including cancer, lung disease or reproductive, endocrinal and immune system disorders, by stressing the idea that children are more vulnerable to the dangers of pesticides and contaminants than adults (Mühlendahl et al., 1996; Koletzko et al., 1999) . In that respect the EU impose a very severe rule concerning the MRL of pesticide in the food intended for infants and toddlers through its Directive 2006/125/CE which imposes that no more than 0.01 mg/kg of any pesticides should be found in baby foods. The European 2006 Directive can be interpreted as a form of protection of this emerging baby food market constraining other countries to export primary product rather than processed one to the European markets. In this study we assess the impact of the EU food safety regulation on its imports of baby food products using a gravity analysis. In the first two sections of the paper we describe the EU regulation and compare it to those of its main trade partners. Following the recent literature on food safety regulations and standard (Achterbosch et al., 2009; Rau et al., 2010, Drogué and DeMaria 2012; Winchester et al., 2012; Li and Beghin, 2012) we build and index to assess the degree of severity of the EU regulation in From a policy perspective, this study provides evidence that at global level the EU regulation on MRL of pesticides is a crucial element across trading partners. When countries' analysis is considered the EU regulation acts as barrier to trade of baby food products just for Japan. If a coun-try is able to comply with the EU requisite then the EU regulation does not constrain trade. We are trying to answer to the following question: does the EU regulation protect health or trade?
We may think about the EU requisite as a standard of safety and quality which aims to protect the health of the most vulnerable part of the population. In this perspective the EU regulation seems to produce the desired effect. Safety may be considered as a synonymous of quality which determines the level of the trade. The EU imports increase from the countries producing high safety products, in this sense we may read the Heckman's results. These results are also confirmed by the data market. Parents have become more and more demanding in terms of the quality and safety of the food they give to their children. Maguire et al. showed that "parents are concerned about the risk posed by pesticides in baby food, and for those who choose to purchase organic foods, the health benefits are a primary motivation" Maguire et al. (2006) We acknowledge that these findings present some limit especially dependent on the database used. As previously said, no MRL on processed products exists, thus we are compelled to associate the MRL for fresh products to processed ones. Baby food is a limited market and a particular sector involving few actors. The information is not always available and further analysis is needed. This should be considered as the starting point of a deeper analysis of an unexplored market which should encompass the evolution in regulations.
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